Corporate Governance and Earnings Management Nexus: Evidence from the UK and Egypt Using Neural Networks’ by Abdou, Hussein et al.
Article
Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management Nexus: Evidence from the UK and 
Egypt Using Neural Networks’
Abdou, Hussein, Ellelly, Nouran N., Elamer, Ahmed A., Hussainey, 
Khaled and Yazdifar, Hassan
Available at http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/33925/
Abdou, Hussein ORCID: 0000-0001-5580-1276, Ellelly, Nouran N., Elamer, Ahmed A., 
Hussainey, Khaled and Yazdifar, Hassan (2020) Corporate Governance and Earnings 
Management Nexus: Evidence from the UK and Egypt Using Neural Networks’. 
International Journal of Finance and Economics . ISSN 1076-9307  
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.2120
For more information about UCLan’s research in this area go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/researchgroups/ and search for <name of research Group>.
For information about Research generally at UCLan please go to 
http://www.uclan.ac.uk/research/ 
All outputs in CLoK are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including
Copyright law.  Copyright, IPR and Moral Rights for the works on this site are retained 
by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Terms and conditions for use 
of this material are defined in the http://clok.uclan.ac.uk/policies/
CLoK
Central Lancashire online Knowledge
www.clok.uclan.ac.uk
R E S E A R CH AR T I C L E
Corporate governance and earnings management nexus:
Evidence from the UK and Egypt using neural networks
Hussein A. Abdou1,2 | Nouran N. Ellelly3 | Ahmed A. Elamer4 |
Khaled Hussainey5 | Hassan Yazdifar6
1The Lancashire School of Business &
Enterprise; Faculty of Business and
Justice, The University of Central
Lancashire, Preston, Lancashire, UK
2Department of Management, Faculty of
Commerce, Mansoura University,
Mansoura, Egypt
3Accounting Department; Faculty of
Commerce, Portsaid University, Portsaid,
Egypt
4Brunel Business School, Brunel
University London, Uxbridge, UK
5Department of Accounting and Financial
Management, Portsmouth Business
School, Portsmouth University,
Portsmouth, UK
6Department for Accounting, Finance and
Economics, Bournemouth University,
Bournemouth, UK
Correspondence
Hussein A. Abdou, Faculty of Business
and Justice Director of Research &
Professor of Banking and Finance; The
Lancashire School of Business &
Enterprise; Faculty of Business & Justice;
The University of Central Lancashire;
Preston; PR1 2HE; UK.
Email: habdou@uclan.ac.uk
Abstract
Using conventional regressions and generalized regression neural networks
(GRNNs), we examine the relationship between corporate governance
(CG) and earnings management (EM). We also examine whether governance
quality moderates the association between EM and CG for a sample of British
and Egyptian companies. Our findings show that: (a) UK firms are likely to
have lower levels of EM if they: have smaller boards, are dominated by inde-
pendent outside directors, and have a low percentage of female directors;
(b) Egyptian firms are likely to have lower levels of EM if they: have larger
boards, are dominated by independent outside directors, and have a low per-
centage of female directors; (c) The governance quality (control of corruption)
has a significant hidden effect on EM. Since our results provide empirical evi-
dence that the board of directors plays a vital role in mitigating EM, these find-
ings might lead to an improvement in the credibility of financial statements
for investors in both the UK and Egypt. As policy implications, our findings
inform regulators and policy-makers that corruption has a very strong hidden
effect on EM and that they can deter EM by controlling the corruption level in
their countries.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
The aftermath of the considerable rise in earnings
restatement and financial scandals, such as WorldCom,
Enron, MG Rover Group, and Northern Rock, has raised
investor concerns about corporate governance (CG). The
concept of CG has attracted the interest of many authors
and researchers as a possible solution to the agency
problems of the relationships between managers and
owners. Previous research suggests that CG plays an
important role in monitoring managers' actions in addi-
tion to restricting possible opportunistic behaviour:
hence, CG mechanisms will be able to reduce agency
costs (González & García-Meca, 2014). The board of
directors (BoDs) is a key CG mechanism, which is
responsible for aligning the interest of stockholders and
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managers and mitigating the inherent agency problems.
Moreover, it has been argued that the BoDs deters oppor-
tunistic behaviour (Marra, Mazzola, & Prencipe, 2011;
Park & Shin, 2004). Fama and Jensen (1983) argued that
the BoDs plays a leading role in CG, especially in moni-
toring top management. Thus, this study examines the
governance role of the BoDs on mitigating earnings man-
agement (EM).
The theoretical and empirical literature offers mixed
findings related to the association between BoDs and EM
(Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010). Agency theorists sug-
gest that the board should be denominated by outside
directors in order to mitigate EM. Furthermore, they
argue that a small board size is preferable, and that sepa-
ration between the CEO and the chairperson of the BoDs
is critical for the effectiveness of the board's monitoring
responsibility (e.g., Eckles, Halek, He, Sommer, &
Zhang, 2011). From the viewpoint of stewardship theory,
larger and independent boards are preferable to mitigate
agency problems (Bhagat & Black, 1999). Moreover, stew-
ardship theory argues that CEO duality is essential to
unify firm leadership (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). This
contradictory theoretical framework is also mirrored in
previous empirical studies.
Although a number of prior studies have investigated
the relationship between BoDs and corporate EM practices
(Anglin et al., 2013; Chen & Zhang, 2014; Leventis &
Dimitropoulos, 2012; Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010), a
prudent evaluation of this literature reveals a number of
weaknesses. First, the governance role of the BoDs has
recently been a growing area of research, although most
prior empirical research has concentrated on developed
countries. Little attention has been focused on the relation-
ship between CG and EM in developing contexts such as
India (Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008), Jordan (Al-khabash &
Al-Thuneibat, 2009), and Egypt, where most companies
are family owned (Soliman & Ragab, 2014). Second, it can
be noticed that the vast majority of CG and EM research
has been conducted within a single country
(Doupnik, 2008). Third, previous research (e.g., Elghuweel
et al., 2017; Judge, 2010) suggests that the extent to which
formal and informal CG structures are employed vary
worldwide. For instance, equity-based markets tend to be
the key CG arrangements in Anglo-American economies
(e.g., UK and US) compared to concentrated ownership
constructions in Arab countries (e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia)
African (e.g., South Africa and Nigeria) and Asian
(e.g., China, Malaysia and Singapore) economies. In devel-
oping countries (e.g., China and Egypt), however, the main
CG mechanism is often the state/informal systems. Not-
withstanding these variances in CG structure worldwide,
current studies have directed excessively to evaluate the
influence of Anglo-Saxon CG arrangements on EM to the
neglect of the others (Alves, 2012; Bekiris &
Doukakis, 2011; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Ghosh et al., 2010),
and thus debatably weakening present understanding of
the influence of CG on EM in different countries. Fourth
and although a number of studies have examined the rela-
tionship between CG and EM (Bowen et al., 2008; Jiang
et al., 2008; McNichols, 2000), they are noticeably focused
in a few developed countries, such as US and UK, which
tend to have principally similar CG, economic, legal and
institutional contexts (Elghuweel et al., 2017; Gavious,
Segev, & Yosef, 2012; Krishnan & Parsons, 2008). Though,
it can be claimed that in developing countries, such as
Egypt with dissimilar CG, economic and legal environ-
ment, formal CG mechanisms ability to restrain managers
to engage in EM may differ, and consequently the link
between CG and EM can be likely to vary (Elghuweel
et al., 2017).
The comparison between the UK and Egypt is inter-
esting, since the two countries offer unique sets of char-
acteristics and differences. Firstly, the UK is one of the
developed countries in the Group of Eight (G8), which
includes the leading industrial countries, while Egypt is
one of the developing countries in the (D8) Organization
for Economic Cooperation. Secondly, the UK has a strong
common law tradition, while Egypt is a civil law country.
Thirdly, the UK has a market-based economy (relying on
capital markets and the issuance of securities to finance
corporate investment), while Egypt is considered as a
bank-based economy (relying on debt markets and the
issuance of bonds to finance corporate investment).
Finally, the UK is one of the highest ranked countries in
terms of having the lowest perceived levels of corruption,
while Egypt is one of the lowest ranked countries in this
regard, being perceived as having excessive levels of cor-
ruption (Transparency International, 2015). In addition,
there are historical relations between the two nations, as
Egypt was one of the largest British colonies in the early/
mid-19th century: as such, Egyptian firms can use UK
firms as a benchmark to develop their CG mechanisms.
Our paper contributes to current research as follows.
First, we use a non-parametric technique, namely the
Generalized Regression Neural Network (GRNN), as well
as using conventional techniques, namely OLS and fixed/
random effect regressions. Our study offers a unique con-
tribution by empirically incorporating GRNN, which may
extend and improve future governance research. We
argue that the use of neural networks is an area of meth-
odological improvement in future governance-related lit-
erature. Specifically, GRNN is better able to capture
nonlinear relationships compared to conventional tech-
niques. In addition, the complexity in the current envi-
ronment and firms provides further motivation to use
neural networks, as one of their advantages is that they
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are able to represent complex relationships between a set
of variables. Second, our results extend the nascent
research on the relationship between CG and EM in
Egypt. To the best of our knowledge, there is no research,
to date, which examines the relationship between gender
diversity on boards and EM in Egypt. Third, in developing
our hypotheses, we use a multi-theoretical framework
which relies on insights from the agency, stewardship,
resource dependence, information asymmetry, managerial
signalling, organizational and stakeholder theories. Fourth,
our findings have important policy implications by casting
light on the effect of corruption on EM. To the best of our
knowledge, this study presents a first attempt to examine
the moderating effect of governance quality, measured in
terms of the control of corruption, on the relationship
between EM and CG. Finally, our study contributes to
understanding international differences in EM by applying
comparison between two countries, as the vast majority of
previous studies rely only on one single country.
Our findings suggest that for the UK, firms with a
high percentage of independent outside directors, small
board size, and low percentage of female board members
are likely to have lower levels of EM. For Egypt, firms
with a high percentage of independent outside directors,
bigger boards, and low percentage of female board mem-
bers are likely to have lower levels of EM. Further inves-
tigation indicates that corruption has a strong hidden
effect on EM in the Egyptian firms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 provides the theoretical framework, synthesizes
relevant literature, and develops hypotheses. Section 3
describes the research design. Section 4 discusses the empir-
ical findings. Section 5 concludes.
2 | LITERATURE REVIEW AND
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
We employ a multi-theoretical framework due to the com-
plex nature of CG and in response to the call for the adop-
tion of a multiple-theoretical framework (Filatotchev &
Boyd, 2009). Moreover, Nicolae and Violeta (2013) report
that for effective CG, it is better to apply a blend of existing
theories rather than an individual theory. Hence, our
study relies on insights from the agency, stewardship,
resource dependence, information asymmetry, managerial
signalling, organizational and stakeholder theories.
2.1 | Theoretical framework
The variations in EM could be explained through a
multi-theoretical lens because a generally accepted
theory that links BoDs and EM is still elusive
(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Huse et al., 2011; van Ees
et al., 2009). In addition, we employ a multi-theoretical
perspective as a direct response to the latest calls for
multi-theoretical approaches to studying CG and EM
(Elghuweel et al., 2017; Huse et al., 2011; van Ees et al.,
2009). One reason is that single theories may not be
able to offer a complete understanding of how BoDs
mechanisms may affect EM on their own. By contrast,
linking insights from a multi-theoretical perspective
may offer unique insights towards interpreting and
explaining EM in different regulatory and institutional
contexts, such as the UK and Egypt. Also, a multi-
theoretical perspective may facilitate the examination
of the potential interactions among BoDs, governance
quality and EM (Elamer et al., 2017, 2018, 2019a,
2019b; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Huse et al., 2011; van Ees
et al., 2009; Zona et al., 2018). From this perspective,
joint insights from agency, stewardship, resource
dependence, information asymmetry, managerial sig-
nalling, organizational and stakeholder theories may
help in improving the relevance of BoDs and gover-
nance quality mechanisms in explaining the varied
motivations for engaging in EM. This is particularly
important given the regulatory, and socio-
demographical diversity of the UK and Egypt, where
multi-theoretical approach could help in explaining
results relating to the relationship between BoDs, gov-
ernance quality and EM (Elghuweel et al., 2017; Zattoni
& Van Ees, 2012; Zona et al., 20142018).
In particular, there are several theoretical reasons
why firms could be motivated to mitigate EM. Agency
theory predicts that effective mechanisms relating to
BoDs may lead to more transparent financial reporting.
Consequently, mitigate EM can mitigate agency conflicts
and reduce the information asymmetry between manage-
ment and shareholders (Elghuweel et al., 2017; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Signalling theory literature suggests that
firms mitigate EM in order to send signals about the
quality of their reporting to prospective investors
(Connelly et al., 2011; Elghuweel et al., 2017). However,
the explanatory power of agency and signalling theories
is limited as they tend to focus exclusively on managers
and shareholders/investors to the detriment of other
stakeholders, such as the local community. From stew-
ardship and stakeholder theories perspective, mitigate
EM may be a strategic approach towards enhancing their
legitimacy to exist and conduct their operations with key
stakeholders (Elghuweel et al., 2017; Pittroff, 2014). Simi-
larly, stakeholder theory has been criticized for being
vague about the identity of the key stakeholders of the
firm, and therefore, limited ability to elucidate observable
differences in EM.
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Resources dependence theory predicts that mitigate
EM can offer firms access to critical resources, such as
funding and contracts (Elghuweel et al., 2017). Also,
resources dependence theory offers a number of benefits,
resulting from the firm and national governance effective-
ness through wider inter-dependencies of companies. Spe-
cifically, firm and national governance effectiveness work
as an instrument for firms to reduce uncertainty and
dependence through mitigate EM. However, the ability of
resource dependence theory to explain discernible differ-
ences in EM is also limited by its excessive focus on
directing EM at securing resources, especially financial
resources and stakeholders, who may not necessarily be
the main drivers of EM.
With these apparent limitations of each individual
theory, but yet different firm motivations for engaging in
EM, this study seeks to enhance these theories explana-
tory power by drawing insights from all of them together
(i.e., agency, stewardship, resource dependence, informa-
tion asymmetry, managerial signalling, organizational
and stakeholder perspectives) in examining and under-
standing the associations among BoDs, governance qual-
ity, and EM. To add further theoretical nuance to our
multi-theoretical lens, we cogitate how national gover-
nance quality may influence EM.
2.2 | Empirical literature and
hypotheses development
2.2.1 | Independent outside directors
One of the most important characteristics associated with
strong CG is the board composition, which denotes the
separation between inside directors and outside directors.
The term “insider” refers to directors who are engaged in
companies' management: in other words, they are man-
agers and/ or controlling shareholders (De Andres,
Azofra, & Lopez, 2005). Outsiders are directors who are
independent of the firm's management. There are differ-
ent definitions of “independence”: one of the commonly
used definitions is “having no relationships or circum-
stances which could affect the director's judgment”
(Mallin, 2006). Another definition of board independence
refers to the ratio of outside directors on the board (Klien,
2002). In general, Becht, Bolton, and Röell (2003) define
independent directors as those with no relation with the
company's management except for their presence on
the BoDs.
Proponents of more independent outside directors
rely on three theories: the agency, resource indepen-
dence, and information asymmetry and signalling theo-
ries. Agency theory emphasizes conflicts of interest
between stockholders and management, which result
because of the separation of ownership and management.
Thus, agency theory suggests that independent boards
should be more efficient to monitor and enhance man-
agement performance. Therefore, the board composition
should be denominated by outside directors (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) con-
tend that outside directors enhance the viability of the
board, as in order to maintain and develop their reputa-
tion as independent directors, they have to monitor effec-
tively. Baranchuk and Dybvig (2009) report that outside
directors enhance firms' resources by offering experience
and expertise. Additionally, Black, Love, and
Rachinsky (2006) state that independent directors reduce
information asymmetry by signalling insiders to deal
with potential shareholders reasonably. Another stream
of the theoretical (stewardship) literature suggests that
managers are good agents. Hence, insider directors are
preferable (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Pre-
vious studies show conflicting results regarding the rela-
tion between independent outside directors and EM.
Previous studies (Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2005; Xie,
Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003) conclude that chances of com-
mitting EM are lower for companies that have larger
numbers of independent outside directors. For example,
Hutchinson, Percy, and Erkurtoglu (2008) find that the
percentage of independent outside directors on the board
is related to lower performance-adjusted discretionary
accruals. Additionally, other studies find that indepen-
dent outside directors will effectively control managers
and hence reduce the possibility of EM (Lo, Wong, &
Firth, 2010; Marra et al., 2011; Zalata & Roberts, 2015).
On the contrary, other studies support stewardship the-
ory, which proposes that increasing the number of inde-
pendent outside directors may not achieve improvement
in monitoring EM. For example, Bhagat and Black (1999)
find that there is no empirical evidence that firms should
have “supermajority independent boards.” Other
research (Laux, 2008; Park & Shin, 2004) finds that there
is no significant relationship between EM and the per-
centage of outside directors on the board. Hence, we
hypothesized that:
H1 Firms with more outside directors, in the UK and
Egypt, tend to have lower levels of EM.
2.2.2 | Board size
There is no consensus regarding the relationship between
the size of the board and EM. On one hand, larger boards
have been shown to offer more advantages for their firms
by sharing experience, knowledge, and opinions from
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different resources that lead to improving the board's
monitoring function, and hence decrease the incidence of
EM (Peasnell et al., 2005). On the other hand,
Jensen (1993) argues that smaller boards play a control-
ling role. Also, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) show that larger
boards are less efficient and more time-consuming, and
that it is harder to communicate when the board size is
large. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) find that firms
engaged in EM have larger boards than do those not
engaged in EM. Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue
that the larger the board size, the greater the agency
problems. Zalata and Roberts (2015) find that larger
boards are more likely to have a higher extent of EM.
A contrary theoretical view (agency and resource
dependence) is that larger boards are more effective in
avoiding corporate failure and securing critical resources
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003). Addi-
tionally, some studies find that larger boards are related
to lower levels of discretionary accruals (Peasnell
et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2003). We therefore hypothe-
sized that:
H2 Firms with smaller BoDs, in the UK and Egypt, tend
to have lower levels of EM.
2.2.3 | CEO duality
Another board characteristic is the leadership structure.
There are two types of leadership: combined and sepa-
rated leadership (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001). Com-
bined leadership means that the CEO is acting as a board
chairman, while separated leadership means that posi-
tions of the CEO and the chairperson are held by differ-
ent people. There is a theoretical debate between the
agency, resource dependence, and stewardship theories
on leadership type (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010).
Agency theory suggests that separation between the CEO
and the chairperson is important for the effectiveness of
the board's monitoring responsibility. Separated leader-
ship is likely to decrease earnings management because
the chairman monitors the actions of the CEO. Addition-
ally, Eckles et al. (2011) find that CEO duality leads to an
increase in agency conflicts because managers and share-
holders might create reserves depending on their com-
pensation. Sarkar et al. (2008) find a positive relationship
between CEO duality and EM. Other studies also support
the agency theory viewpoint of separation between the
CEO and the chairman (Lo et al., 2010; Zalata &
Roberts, 2015).
However, stewardship and resource dependence theo-
rists suggest that CEO duality is essential to unify firm
leadership and that when the roles of the CEO and chair
of the board are held by the same person, this will lead to
unified objectives. Hence, stewardship theory assumes
that firms which have CEO duality will perform better
than those which have not and will be less likely to have
EM (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010). Xie et al.'s (2003)
and Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau's (2004) results sup-
port the stewardship theory viewpoint that there is a neg-
ative relationship between CEO duality and EM. We
therefore hypothesized that:
H3 Firms with CEO duality, in the UK and Egypt, tend to
have higher levels of EM.
2.2.4 | Board diversity
Gender is the most disputed diversity issue. In the cur-
rent study, board diversity will be measured in terms of
the percentage of female members on the board. Coun-
tries such as Norway and Italy have designed systems
and rules to enforce companies to increase female repre-
sentation on the board, while similar legislations are tak-
ing place in the UK and France. The relationship
between board diversity, EM, earnings quality, and cor-
porate financial outcomes has been predicted by mixed
theoretical propositions. Proponents of diversity rely on
the agency, resource dependence, signalling, and stake-
holder theories (Gull, Nekhili, Nagati, & Chtioui, 2018).
Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) supports board
gender diversity. Indeed, board diversity increases board
independence, which in turn enhances monitoring of man-
agement (Gull et al., 2018). Moreover, it deters conflicts of
interest between stockholders and management. A number
of studies argue that increasing the number of females on
the board has numerous advantages: they can provide new
ideas and perspectives, improve communication, increase
firm value, make effective decisions, improve earnings qual-
ity, mitigate the practice of EM, provide more reliable finan-
cial reports, reduce agency problems and costs, improve
financial performance, and create a competitive advantage
(Hutchinson, Mack, & Plastow, 2015; Isidro & Sobral, 2015;
Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011). Moreover, it is shown that
female directors actively attend board meetings, which
strengthens board supervision (Adams & Ferreira, 2009).
Moreover, resource dependence theory shows that female
diversity helps to secure critical resources, including skills
and business contacts (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994).
Additionally, board diversity may help to offer a better con-
nection with a firm's stakeholders (Gull et al., 2018).
In line with the theories supporting female diversity,
Krishnan and Parsons (2008) report a positive relation-
ship between earnings quality and the proportion of
woman participating on the board. Similarly, Srinidhi
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et al. (2011) and Gavious et al. (2012) find a negative rela-
tionship between EM and the percentage of females on
the board. Thiruvadi and Huang (2011) find that the pres-
ence of female directors mitigates EM by increasing nega-
tive discretionary accruals. Liu, Wei, and Xie (2016) find
that gender diversity reduces EM if the workplace envi-
ronment empowers women. Nonetheless, based on
agency and organization opponents, board diversity does
not necessarily result in more effective monitoring. More-
over, organization theory shows that board diversity pre-
cludes the board's ability to take conclusive action
regarding strategic changes. Sun, Liu, and Lan (2011)
find that there is no relationship between female direc-
tors and EM. Arun, Almahrog, and Aribi (2015) find a
positive relationship between the percentage of females
on the board and EM. In a nutshell, and based on agency
theory, we can say that having more females participat-
ing on the board is considered to be one of the most
important CG mechanisms for monitoring managers and
mitigating EM. We therefore hypothesized that:
H4 Firms with more female directors, in the UK and
Egypt, tend to have lower levels of EM.
2.2.5 | The moderating influence of
governance quality on the relationship
between board structure and EM
While corruption is widespread in emerging economics,
there is a growing focus on the degree of its predictability to
influence the effective operational of governments and
economies (Elamer et al., 2017, 2018, 2019a, 2019b, 2020).
Elamer et al. (2019a) examind the impact of corruption on
risk management and disclosure in a sample of MENA
banks. Dela Rama (2011) looks at how the CG affect differ-
ent forms of corruption in Asia. Although there has been
extensive research on the impact of CG mechanisms on
EM, extant research has not, to the best of our knowledge,
examined the moderating effect of control of corruption
on the relationship between CG and EM. On one hand,
some previous studies show that the role of CG is to
combat corruption (Krishnamurthy, Rangaswamy, &
Prabhakaran, 2011; Nanda, 2006; Weitzel & Berns, 2006;
Wu, 2005) and their results show a negative relationship
between CG and corruption. On the other hand, other
research examines the impact of corruption on EM
(e.g., González & García-Meca, 2014; Han, Kang, Salter, &
Yoo, 2010; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Lourenço,
Rathke, Santana, and Branco (2018) show a positive link
between the level of corruption and EM. We expect that the
presence of corruption increases the risks of the EM,
because managers may tend to be less conservative and risk
averse when making financial investment-related decisions
which can lead to smaller board vigilance in the monitoring
of financial statements. Thus, managers may have opportu-
nistic behaviour, a situation that is feasible due to the rela-
tively high levels of asymmetry information that
characterize the economic activity (Elghuweel et al., 2017).
In addition, corruption, inefficiency of governments and
other weaknesses in the developing countries compare to
developed countries infrastructure, increase transaction and
agency costs, therefore limiting firm's income (Manzetti &
Wilson 2007) and, accordingly, increase the opportunistic
behaviour of managers. We therefore hypothesized that:
H5 Governance quality, in the UK and Egypt, moderates
the relationship between board structure and EM.
2.2.6 | Corporate governance-earnings
management nexus statistical techniques
We identified a research gap in our investigation of the
effect of corporate governance on earnings management in
both the UK and Egypt. We found that neural networks,
namely GRNN, have been neglected in extant research.
Following previous literature on other finance disciplines
such as dividend policy (Abdou, Pointon, El-Masry,
Olugbode, & Lister, 2012), which has found that nonlinear
neural networks outperformed conventional regressions
and capital structure (Abdou, Kuzmic, Pointon, &
Lister, 2012; Pao, 2008), and that neural networks accom-
plish better model-fitting and predictions, we expect that
our GRNN can enhance the quality of conventional regres-
sions and provide results that are more robust. The follow-
ing hypothesis is therefore proposed:
H6 GRNNs offer better model-fitting and predictions than
do conventional regressions in analysing the corpo-
rate governance-earnings management nexus in both
the UK and Egypt.
3 | DATA AND METHODS
3.1 | Data
A sample of non-financial firms in the UK and Egypt over
a period of 7 years from 2004 to 2010 has been used to ana-
lyse the impact of CG on mitigating EM. Banks and finan-
cial services firms are not included in our sample due to
the fact that their reported earnings, as well as cash flow
from operations, differ dramatically from other firms, or in
other words because of capital structure and regulatory rea-
sons (e.g., Adams & Ferreira, 2009). Companies are
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selected for this study based on the following reasons:
firstly, the availability of financial data over 7 years,
starting in 2004 and ending in 2010; secondly, the availabil-
ity of information about the BoDs, such as the percentage
of independent directors, board size, CEO duality, and the
proportion of females on the board. These criteria are set
based on several motives. Firstly, and in line with past stud-
ies (Henry, 2008), the criteria allowed this research to sat-
isfy the constraints for a balanced panel data analysis. The
advantages of employing panel data are that it provides
both time-series and cross-sectional sample observations,
more degrees of freedom and less multicollinearity among
the variables (Wooldridge, 2010). Secondly, an examination
of 7-year cross-sectional time-series datasets might be bene-
ficial in defining whether the observed cross-sectional rela-
tionship between board characteristics and EM sustains
over time (Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012). Thirdly, the
sample starts in 2004 because data were available from
2004 onwards. Our sample period ends in 2010 because of
the 2011 Egyptian revolution, which destroyed the Egyptian
economy and caused a collapse in the financial situation for
most companies. In addition, we found that corporate gov-
ernance data was not available for years 2011 onwards.
Fourth, Egyptian companies have been selected from the
most active 50 companies listed in the Egyptian stock mar-
ket, as these companies represent the community binding
the application of the rules and standards of CG issued by
the Capital Market Authority.
Data required for this study were collected from the
Egyptian companies for information dissemination; com-
panies' websites (the published annual financial reports);
and the Kompass Egypt financial yearbook. On the other
hand, UK companies were selected from FTSE 100 and
data were collected from the published annual reports
and the Fame Database. The Corruption Perceptions
Index (2015) was used to collect annual data about the
level of corruption for each country. Using the above
criteria, the final sample consisted of 742 firm-year obser-
vations (66 British non-financial firms with 462 firm-year
observations and 40 Egyptian non-financial firms with
280 firm-year observations) after excluding firms that had
been suspended, those that were newly listed and those
with missing data.
3.2 | Variables and measures
In our empirical examination, we use three main types of
variables. Firstly, our main independent variable is board
characteristics. Secondly, EM is our main dependent vari-
able. Thirdly, we use control of corruption as a proxy for
governance quality to examine H5. Finally, based on liter-
ature (e.g., Lo et al., 2010), this study includes a number
of exogenous variables. Table 1 defines all variables
employed in this research.
TABLE 1 Summary of variables definitions and measurement methods
Coding Variable Measurement
Panel A: Earnings management (dependent) Variable
EM Earnings management The absolute value of discretionary accruals is used as a proxy of EM
Panel B: Corporate governance (independent) Variables
PIOD Independent outside directors The ratio of independent outside directors to total number of the board of directors
BSIZ Board size Total Number of members on the board of directors
DUAL CEO duality A value of (1) is assigned if the chairman and CEO are the same person and (0) otherwise
BFEM Board female The ratio of females on the board to total number of the board of directors
Panel C: Governance quality indicator
CGQ Governance quality (corruption) Control of Corruption will be used as a proxy
Panel D: Control (exogenous) Variables
AUDF Audit firm A value of (1) is assigned if the firm's external auditor is one of the Big 4 and (0) otherwise
FSIZ Firm size Measured as the natural log of total assets
FPROF Firm profitability Using ROA, the ratio of net income before interest and taxes to total assets
FCS Firm capital structure Using leverage, the ratio of total debt to total assets
FLIQ Firm liquidity The ratio of Current Assets minus Inventory to Current Liabilities
FGROW Firm growth The ratio of the difference between current year's sales last year's sales to last year's sales
FLOSS Firm loss A value of (1) is assigned if the firm's has loss and (0) otherwise
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3.2.1 | Earnings management
Absolute discretionary accruals have been employed as a
proxy for EM (dependent variable). Most prior literature has
used a cross-sectional regression of the Modified Jones
model (1991) because prior research finds this model to be
superior in identifying abnormal accruals (e.g., Dechow,
Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Jaggi & Leung, 2007). As a result of
larger sample size, the cross-sectional form of the model has
been found to be superior to the time-series form of the
model (Peasnell et al., 2005). The cross-sectional model takes
into consideration the influence of changes in the economic
setting that influence a specific industry in a particular year.
As a result, the discretionary accruals are calculated using
the modified Jones cross-sectional model. The model first
establishes total accruals, which are then partitioned into
discretionary (managed) and non-discretionary accruals.
The discretionary portion is then regressed on CG variables
of sampled companies. The following are the steps for apply-
ing the modified Jones cross-sectional model:
TA=NIBEI –CFO ð1Þ
NDAt = α0+ α1 1=At−1½ 
+ α2 ΔREVt −ΔRECtð Þ=At−1½ + α3 PPEt=At−1½ ,
ð2Þ
where TA refers to total accruals; NIBEI refers to net
income before extraordinary items; CFO refers to cash
flows from operating activities; NDAt refers to non-
discretionary accruals of year t; At-1 refers to total assets
at the end of year t-1; ΔREVt refers to revenues in year
t less revenue in year t-1; ΔRECt refers to net receivables
in year t less net receivable in year t-1; PPEt refers to
gross property plant and equipment at the end of year t;
and α1, α2, α3 are model parameters, which can be esti-
mated using the following equation:
DAt =TAt=At−1 – α1 1=At−1½ 
+ α2 ΔREVt−ΔRECtð Þ=At−1½ + α3 PPEt=At−1½ :
ð3Þ
3.2.2 | Corporate governance
Our main independent variable is CG, represented by four
sub-variables. Firstly, the proportion of independent out-
side directors is calculated as the number of non-executive
outside directors to the total number of the BoDs. Secondly,
the board size is the total number of board directors.
Thirdly, CEO Duality, a dichotomous variable, explores the
separation of the chairperson and CEO; the variable is allo-
cated a value of 0 if the chairperson and CEO are separate
and 1 otherwise. Fourthly, board diversity is the number of
females on the board relative to the total number of mem-
bers on the BoDs.
3.2.3 | Exogenous variables
Based on the CG and EM literature (e.g., Lo et al., 2010), we
controlled for a number of exogenous variables. Those vari-
ables broadly affect EM. First, audit firm denotes whether
the firm's auditor is a Big 4 firm: it gives a value of 1 if the
auditor is a Big 4 firm and 0 otherwise (Gavious et al., 2012).
Second, large firms have more incentives to manage earn-
ings downward in order to get rid of political costs (Watts &
Zimmerman, 1978). Moreover, Lobo and Zhou (2006) state
that users are unable to detect overstatement in large firm
size due to complexity. However, other studies have argued
that large firms are less likely to manage earnings because
of having a better governance structure and lower informa-
tion asymmetry (Atik, 2009). Thus, we include firm size, cal-
culated by the log of total assets (LASS), but without
estimates about the sign of the coefficient. Third, we also
accounted for firm profitability using return on assets
(ROA). Jaggi et al. (2009) suggest a negative relationship
between ROA and EM. In contrast, Kasznik (1999) finds a
positive coefficient on ROA. Due to this unclear relationship,
we posit a non-directional prediction for ROA.
Fourth, we also controlled for firm capital structure and
liquidity. Leverage (LEV) is used as a proxy for firm capital
structure, calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets
(Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011). Lee, Lev, and Yeo (2007) showed
a negative relationship between EM and leverage. On the
other hand, Othman and Zeghal (2006) found a positive rela-
tionship. Firm liquidity (FLIQ) is calculated as the ratio of
total current assets to total current liabilities. We do not pre-
dict the sign for the correlations of both leverage (LEV) and
FLIQ with EM due to the contradictory theoretical expecta-
tions. Fifth, firm growth is calculated using the ratio of the
difference between the current year's sales and last year's
sales to last year's sales. Consistent with the previous studies,
there is a positive link between sales growth (SGROW) and
EM (Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010). Finally, to reduce
losses, companies facing financial difficulties have a strong
incentive to increase reported income. Thus, the loss is con-
trolled where a value of 1 is assigned if the firms have a loss
and 0 otherwise (Dabor & Adeyemi, 2009).
3.3 | Model specification
We firstly use OLS and fixed-effects regression analyses
(e.g., Elamer et al., 2017, 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Elghuweel
et al., 2017; Ghosh et al., 2010; Huse et al., 2011; van Ees
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et al., 2009; Zona et al., 2018) to investigate the effect of
CG on EM, and to investigate whether this relationship is
moderated by governance quality (i.e., control of corrup-
tion). Therefore, our regression models to be considered
are identified as follows:
EMit = α0 +
X4
i=1
βiCGit +
X7
i=1
βiCONTROLSit + δit + εit
ð4Þ
EMit = α0 +
X4
i=1
βiCGit + βiCGQit
+
X4
i=1
βiCGit ×CGQit +
X7
i=1
βiCONTROLSit + δit + εit
ð5Þ
where EM refers to the absolute value of discretionary
accruals as a proxy of EM for firm i during year t; CG
refers to four corporate governance variables, namely inde-
pendent outside directors (PIOD), board size (BSIZ), CEO
duality (DUAL) and board females (BFEM); CGQ refers to
governance quality, measured by control of corruption;
CONTROLS refers to firm-level control variables, namely
audit firm (AUDF), firm size (FSIZ), firm profitability
(FPROF), firm capital structure (FCS), FLIQ, firm growth
(FGROW), and firm loss (FLOSS); δis the firm-year specific
fixed-effects, and εis the white noise error term.
Secondly, we uniquely employ GRNNs as alternative
non-parametric technique to conventional regressions
(see e.g., Abdou, Kuzmic, et al., 2012; Abdou, Pointon,
et al., 2012). Recently, neural networks have started to
gain prominence as a method to capture non-linearities
in complex relationships and as a substitute for more
conventional statistical methods, such as OLS regression.
Neural networks are an endeavour to model and simulate
the capabilities of human brains. Vellido, Lisboa, and
Vaughan (1999) exemplify the advantages of applying
neural networks in the following points. As non-
parametric methods, neural networks do not make previ-
ous assumptions about the normality and distribution of
the data; they are able to deal with complex nonlinear
mapping and missing data, and the process is highly
automated, thus minimizing human involvement. In
addition, GRNN does not require stationarity tests, as
stated by Abdou, Pointon, et al. (2012). GRNNs are struc-
tured to include four layers as follows: an input layer, a
pattern layer, a summation layer and a decision layer, as
shown in Figure 1.
For GRNN, we firstly take the whole data set for ana-
lytical purposes, and then we divide our sample into a
training (used in building the GRNN models) sub-set and
a hold-out (used for testing the predictive ability of the
fitted models) subset. The training subset comprises 80%
of the overall data set, while the hold-out sub-set com-
prises 20% of the overall data set. These sub-sets are ran-
domly selected using the Palisade software (Palisade
∑
Y
∑ 
X1 X2 X3 X4 Xn Input Layer 
Pattern Layer 
Summation Layer
Output Layer 
FIGURE 1 Generalized Regression Neural Network Structure. This Figure presents a structure of a number of independent predictor
variables for GRNN. The input layer contains a neuron for every independent variable in the model. Each node in the pattern layer, which
contains one node for each training case, measures the distance between each of the input values and the training values reintroduced by
each of the node. Then, each of these values pass to each of the nodes in the summation layer (Numerator and denominator nodes), which is
a function of the distance in the smoothing factors. One node per dependant variable is in the summation layer, each node computes a
weighted average using the training cases in that category. In the summation layer, the nodes sum its inputs, while the output node divide
then to generate the best possible predictions. Source: Own figure adapted from Abdou, Pointon, et al. (2012, p. 800); and Abdou, Kuzmic,
et al. (2012, p. 158)
ABDOU ET AL. 9
Corporation, 2017). We use GRNNs, as the most accurate
neural networks within this software package. We pre-
sent the empirical analyses, including the descriptive sta-
tistics, bivariate correlations, multivariate regression and
GRNN analyses, in the following sections.
4 | EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
4.1 | Descriptive statistics and bivariate
analyses
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables
included in our study for the UK and Egyptian firms. We
do not present a detailed explanation, for brevity, but gener-
ally wide variations have been shown within the variables.
Table 2 indicates, for example, that in UK firms, EM ranges
from a minimum of 0.00 to a maximum of 0.53, with a
mean of 0.05, while in the Egyptian context, EM ranges
from a minimum of 0.00 to a maximum of 5.72, with a
mean of 0.57, which shows a strong difference between the
two countries. Consistent with Arun et al. (2015), the ratio
of females on the board (BFEM) is between 0.00 and 0.73,
with a median of 22% of females on the board. Notwith-
standing the fact that there are firms in Egypt with no
female directors, as in the UK, Egypt has an extremely low
maximum percentage of females on the board, at 27%.
Regarding BSIZ, the range of board members is very close
in both countries. In Egypt, BSIZ ranges from 5.00 to 15.00,
with a median of nine board members, while in the UK it
ranges from 7.00 to 17.00, with a median of 11 board mem-
bers. Other variables of CG mechanisms (independent out-
side directors and CEO duality), as well as the exogenous
variables, show wide variations, consequently diminishing
the possibilities of any bias in sample selection.
Furthermore, there are significant variances in the EM,
CG, and control variables between the two countries, as
shown by the t-test results. The difference of EM indicates
that UK firms tend, on average, to have less EM than do
Egyptian firms. It can be seen that the t-scores for all the
means are significant at 0.01 confidence level, except for
firm profitability, which is significant at 0.05, and firm loss,
which is not significant. Additionally, it is noticed that UK
firms have become relatively larger than those in Egypt in
terms of BSIZ, the ratio of females on the board (BFEM),
AUDF, and firm leverage (FCS), and vice versa for the rest
of the variables. Such contrasts can be discussed in light of
the basic institutional foundations of these two countries,
which mirror the conflicting cultural, economic, and regu-
latory milieus that exist between the UK (a developed coun-
try) and Egypt (a developing country).
Panels A and B of Table 3 represents the Pearson's para-
metric and Spearman's non-parametric correlation matrices
of all variables included in the study for the UK and Egypt,
respectively, to test for multicollinearity. As a robustness
test, Table 3 shows both Pearson's parametric and Spe-
arman's non-parametric correlation matrices. Distinctly,
there are no multicollinearity problems, as proved by the
prominence and direction of both coefficients in both coun-
tries. Of interest, in the UK context, PIOD and BSIZ are sig-
nificantly and positively related to EM, suggesting that
firms with a high proportion of independent outside direc-
tors and a large board tend to have higher levels of
EM. Importantly, while there is a significant negative rela-
tionship between BFEM and EM in UK firms, there is a sig-
nificant positive relationship between BFEM and EM in
Egypt firms, indicating that firms in Egypt with a high per-
centage of females on the board tend to have higher EM
opportunities, and vice versa for UK firms. With reference
to the control variables, the coefficients show that in the
UK, the larger FSIZ and FLOSS, the larger EM. In contrast,
the larger the FSIZ, the lower the level of EM. There is,
however, no evidence to prove that greater firm profitability
(FPROF) and FLIQ lead to significantly less or more EM.
4.2 | Empirical results from
conventional and GRNN statistical
techniques
We use three main types of statistical methods to test our
hypotheses. Firstly, we conduct OLS regression analysis.
Secondly, we undertake the fixed/random effect for each
model: these two tests (OLS and fixed/random effect) are
the most commonly used (the non-flexible models). Thirdly,
this study runs a GRNN, which is a completely flexible
model of the determinants of the CG. We firstly apply the
GRNN for each country, and then, under each country, we
build our models using the overall sample and using the
training sub-set and the hold-out sub-set separately. These
sub-sets are randomly chosen by the software across differ-
ent years for training and hold-out purposes. Additionally,
in order to determine the importance of each of the CG
determinants, we provide a variable impact analysis, which
is automatically calculated by the software. Furthermore,
we run these models (i.e., OLS, fixed/random effect, and
GRNN) twice. The first time is the original model; then we
re-run the test to show the moderating effect of governance
quality (GQ), measured in terms of control of corruption
quality, on the relationship between CG and EM.
4.2.1 | Multivariate regression analyses
Table 4 shows the OLS regression results of the impact of
CG (independent outside directors, BSIZ, CEO duality,
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and females' percentage on board) on EM. Model I of the
table shows a comparison between the UK and Egypt
based on the overall sample for each country from 2004
to 2010. Results indicate that for UK firms, from the CG
variables, only the proportion of females has a significant
positive relationship with EM, but with the wrong sign
for hypothesis H4 (t = 1.89 at the 10% confidence level),
which means that firms with a high percentage of
females on the board tend to have higher levels of
EM. This supports agency and organization theorists,
which suggest that board diversity does not necessarily
result in more effective monitoring. Moreover, organiza-
tion theory shows that board diversity precludes the
board's ability to take conclusive action regarding strate-
gic changes. Our evidence reinforces Arun et al. (2015),
which find a positive relationship between the percentage
of females on the board and EM. For Egyptian firms, the
model provides a higher adjusted R2 compared to the UK
model (30% vs. 3%). The Egypt model yields two signifi-
cant results, namely CEO duality (t = −2.33 at the 5%
confidence level) and females on the board (t = 1.94 at
the 10% confidence level), but with the reverse sign for
hypotheses H3 and H4. These results are consistent with
prior research (Arun et al., 2015; Ramdani &
Witteloostuijn, 2010; Xie et al., 2003), albeit contradictory
to our hypotheses H3 and H4, and provide support for the
multi-theoretical framework. Moreover, Model I of
Table 4 shows that for both countries, the proportion of
independent outside directors on the board (PIOD) is
negatively related to EM, which is in line with our expec-
tations based on the agency, resource independence, and
information asymmetry and signalling theories. In terms
of BSIZ, there is a difference between the two countries.
For instance, in UK firms, BSIZ is positively related to
EM, as we would expect, while for Egypt, BSIZ is nega-
tively related to EM. This implies that, in Egypt, smaller
boards play a better controlling role compare to large
boards (Jensen, 1993; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). This is in
line with Dechow et al. (1996), Hermalin and
Weisbach (2003) and Zalata and Roberts (2015); they sug-
gest that firms engaged in EM have larger boards than do
those not engaged in EM.
Table 5 presents the regression analysis results of the
moderating influence of GQ, measured in terms of con-
trol of corruption, on the relationship between CG and
EM. As previously explained, we build our first model on
the table based on the overall sample from each country.
However, to show the effect of GQ and to test hypothesis
H5, we multiply each governance variable by the value of
corruption for each country. Hence, we obtain four addi-
tional governance variables: proportion of independent
outside directors multiplied by corruption (PIODCORR);
board size multiplied by corruption (BSIZCORR); CEO
duality multiplied by corruption (DUALCORR); and pro-
portion of females on the board multiplied by corruption
(BFEMCORR).
To facilitate comparison, according to the UK context,
Model I of Table 5 produces similar results to the main
results shown by Model I of Table 4, which reflect that
the control of corruption has no effect on UK firms. Sur-
prisingly, in the Egyptian context, corruption has an
inverse effect on CG variables. For instance, PIOD and
DUAL have negative relationships with EM, and BFEM
has a positive relationship with EM; after taking into
account the moderation effect of corruption, it gives an
inverse relation (inverse sign) with EM (+ PIODCORR, +
DUALCORR, and – BFEMCORR), which provides support
to the sign of our hypotheses H3 and H4 and is consistent
with previous research (Srinidhi et al., 2011). This finding
sends an urgent message to the regulators of Egypt that
corruption has a very strong hidden effect on EM and
that they can deter EM by controlling the corruption
level in their country. To sum up, as firms have a ten-
dency to vary in the opportunities and difficulties that
they face over time, this can bring about a circumstance
where CG practices and EM are jointly controlled by sur-
reptitiously firm-particular variables, such as firm com-
plexity (Ntim et al., 2012), which multiple regressions
may be unable to discover. Hence, we will re-test our
hypotheses using fixed/random effect regression.
Table 6 reports the results of fixed/random effect
regression analysis of the effect of board characteristics
on EM. For Model I (overall sample as Model I in
Table 4), we use the fixed effect for UK firms; however,
for Egypt, we rely on the random effect model, since the
Hausman test confirmed the null hypothesis that the
error term did not correlate with the regressors. For UK
firms, the results show that board size (BDSZ) is posi-
tively related to the EM in Model I (t = 1.89 at the 10%
confidence level). This provides empirical support for H2
and is consistent with the agency theory, which suggests
that large boards are less effective, more time-consuming
and make it harder to communicate, which leads to more
agency problems. These findings are similar to those
reported in previous studies, suggesting that firms with
large BSIZ tend to have higher levels of EM (Dechow
et al., 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Zalata &
Roberts, 2015). For the Egyptian firms, the random effect
regression analysis shows no significant relationship
between all the CG variables and EM.
To examine the moderating effect of GQ, we re-ran
the fixed/random effect regression analysis, as shown in
Table 7. As previously discussed in Model I of Table 6,
since the Hausman test confirmed the null hypothesis
that the error term did not correlate with the regressors,
we use the fixed effect for UK firms; however, for Egypt,
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we rely on the random effect model (e.g., Elamer et al.,
2017, 2018, 2019a, 2019b; Elghuweel et al., 2017; Ghosh
et al., 2010; Huse et al., 2011; van Ees et al., 2009; Zona
et al., 2018). Based on the overall sample (Model I) for
UK firms, the results support the moderating effect of
GQ, showing that firms with a high proportion of inde-
pendent outside directors multiplied by corruption
(PIODCORR) have a negative coefficient (t = −1.80 at the
10% confidence level). Furthermore, the results provide
empirical support for H2, as the coefficient of the BSIZ is
positive (t = 2.39 at the 5% confidence level). However,
the results are contradictory to H4 by providing a positive
coefficient (t = 2.07 at the 5% confidence level) for BFEM.
For Egypt, Model I of Table 6 shows that corruption has
an inverse sign effect on PIOD, BSIZ, and DUAL, while it
has no effect on BFEM.
Noticeably and before leaving the discussion of the con-
ventional regression techniques, the results for the Egyptian
firm sample in Model I of Tables 4–7, show a negative rela-
tionship between FSIZ and EM. These results support previ-
ous literature (Bekiris & Doukakis, 2011; Dabor &
Adeyemi, 2009; Dimitropoulos & Asteriou, 2010; Lee
et al., 2007). From this results, joint insights from agency,
stewardship, resource dependence, information asymmetry,
managerial signalling, organizational and stakeholder theo-
ries may help in improving the relevance of BoDs and GQ
mechanisms in explaining the varied motivations for engag-
ing in EM (Elghuweel et al., 2017; Filatotchev & Boyd, 2009;
Huse et al., 2011; Nicolae & Violeta, 2013; van Ees et al.,
2009). To sum up, for the two countries, previous analyses
revealed that the predictive power of non-flexible models
(OLS, and fixed/random effect) is weak, and that model I
(in Tables 4–7, respectively) performs badly. It can be shown
that for all models, the adjusted R2 ranged from 1 to 33%.
Hence, we conduct a GRNN analyses.
4.2.2 | Generalized regression neural
network analyses
GRNN1-Model employs the whole data and shows
remarkable findings for the comparison between the two
countries, as shown in Table 9. Regarding variable
impact, the main determinants of EM vary between the
UK and Egypt. For UK firms, the impact of CG variables
shows that both independent outside directors (PIOD:
20.7%) and females on the board (BFEM: 18.9%) are key
determinants of EM, presenting more than 39% of the
overall model importance. Other CG measures, namely
BSIZ: 6.3%) and CEO duality (DUAL: 0%) are signifi-
cantly less important. Since OLS and fixed effect regres-
sion models provide low adjusted R2 (ranging from 0 to
5%) for UK models, it may be expected that the substitute
methodology, employing GRNN, would have generated a
low prediction rate for the UK. Indeed, our neural net-
work technique, namely GRNN1-Model1, produces a low
bad prediction percentage (100%- 76.4% = 23.6%), as
shown in Table 9. GRNN yields superficial acceptance
compare to the findings of traditional multiple regres-
sion. For Egypt, the results have lower bad prediction
rates than for the UK (100% - 83.6% = 16.4%). The
impacts of CG variables are less important as follows:
female on the board (BFEM: 11.8%); independent outside
directors (PIOD: 2.7%); BSIZ: 0.1%); and CEO duality
(DUAL: 0%), as shown in Table 9.
Comparing the two countries highlighted a number
of findings. Firstly, for the UK, the main CG indicator is
PIOD, while for Egypt the main CG indicator is BFEM.
Secondly, although BFEM is the main variable in Egypt,
it has a greater value in the UK model (i.e., 18.9%
vs. 11.8%), which implies that females on the board have
a stronger effect in the UK context than in the Egyptian
context. Thirdly, BSIZ has a stronger effect in the UK
than in Egypt (6.2% vs. 0.1%). Fourthly, for both coun-
tries, CEO duality has almost no effect (00.1%). Finally,
the most influential year for the UK is 2007 (8%), while
for Egypt it is 2008 (4%), which reflects the effect of the
financial crisis. Noticeably, in Egypt, FSIZ has more than
half of the impact (56.9%), which is consistent with our
conventional regression findings.
We then divide our sample into a training sub-set and
a hold-out sub-set (see Table 10). The hold-out sub-set
plays no role in building the model, while the training
sub-set is used to build the models. As expected, GRNN2-
Model1 shows that, for Egypt, the predictive capabilities
for both the training and the hold-out set are better com-
pared to the UK. In terms of error rates (RMSE and MAE),
our results show that they are much lower in Egypt com-
pared to the UK for both sub-sets. The results presented in
Table 10 show that the variable impact analysis for PIOD
(23.79%) and BFEM (21.43%) are the key determinants of
EM in the UK, while for Egypt, BFEM (20.24%) is the key
determinant of EM. These results are in line with our find-
ings using the overall sample analysis.
The GRNN1-Model2 of Table 11, which utilizes the
whole dataset, exposes very strong consequences after
adding the variables of corruption specifically for the
Egyptian context as follows. Firstly, the Egypt model has
a 100% good prediction rate. Secondly, in terms of error
rates, the model for Egypt shows no errors (i.e., 0%
RMSE; 0% MAE). Thirdly, our results, presented in
Table 10, show that there is no effect of CEO duality on
EM in Egypt; however, after adding corruption, our
results, shown in Table 11, show a strong effect for DUAL
(i.e., 8.5%). Fourthly, the impacts of CG variables are as
follows – BSIZCORR (9.2%), BFEMCORR (8.7%),
18 ABDOU ET AL.
T
A
B
L
E
8
T
h
e
ef
fe
ct
s
of
go
ve
rn
an
ce
on
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
E
S
M
od
el
I:
R
an
d
om
ef
fe
ct
M
od
el
II
:R
an
d
om
ef
fe
ct
M
od
el
II
I:
2S
L
S
M
od
el
IV
:2
SL
S
V
ar
ia
bl
e
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
C
or
p
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
va
ri
ab
le
s
PI
O
D
(−
)
0.
70
(0
.4
9)
−
3.
26
**
*
(0
.0
0)
0.
53
(0
.5
9)
−
4.
05
**
*
(0
.0
0)
0.
74
(0
.4
6)
−
3.
38
**
*
(0
.0
0)
0.
59
(0
.5
5)
−
4.
71
**
*
(0
.0
0)
PI
O
D
C
O
R
R
(−
)
0.
13
(0
.9
0)
−
0.
76
(0
.4
5)
0.
17
(0
.8
6)
−
0.
65
(0
.5
2)
B
SI
Z
(+
)
0.
76
(0
.4
5)
−
1.
56
(0
.1
2)
0.
96
(0
.3
4)
−
2.
44
**
(0
.0
2)
0.
79
(0
.4
3)
−
1.
79
*
(0
.0
7)
0.
99
(0
.3
2)
−
2.
81
**
(0
.0
1)
B
SI
Z
C
O
R
R
(+
)
−
1.
85
*
(0
.0
7)
2.
11
**
(0
.0
4)
−
1.
86
*
(0
.0
6)
1.
95
*
(0
.0
5)
D
U
A
L
(+
)
−
0.
48
(0
.6
3)
−
0.
31
(0
.7
6)
−
0.
43
(0
.6
6)
−
0.
46
(0
.6
5)
−
0.
51
(0
.6
1)
−
0.
35
(0
.7
3)
−
0.
48
(0
.6
3)
−
0.
55
(0
.5
9)
D
U
A
L
C
O
R
R
(+
)
1.
25
(0
.2
1)
0.
53
(0
.5
9)
1.
23
(0
.2
2)
0.
54
(0
.5
9)
B
F
E
M
(−
)
2.
00
*
(0
.0
5)
1.
48
(0
.1
4)
2.
04
**
(0
.0
4)
2.
22
**
(0
.0
3)
2.
09
**
(0
.0
4)
1.
65
(0
.1
0)
2.
11
**
(0
.0
4)
2.
54
**
(0
.0
1)
B
F
E
M
C
O
R
R
(−
)
1.
90
*
(0
.0
6)
−
0.
31
(0
.7
6)
1.
89
*
(0
.0
6)
−
0.
08
(0
.9
4)
C
on
tr
ol
va
ri
ab
le
s
C
or
ru
pt
io
n
(+
)
−
0.
72
(0
.4
7)
0.
27
(0
.7
9)
−
1.
91
*
(0
.0
6)
0.
20
(0
.8
4)
−
0.
71
(0
.4
8)
0.
26
(0
.8
0)
−
1.
89
*
(0
.0
6)
0.
20
(0
.8
4)
A
U
D
F
(−
)
3.
85
**
*
(0
.0
0)
−
0.
19
(0
.8
5)
3.
15
**
*
(0
.0
0)
0.
43
(0
.6
7)
3.
81
**
*
(0
.0
0)
−
0.
09
(0
.9
3)
3.
10
**
*
(0
.0
0)
0.
88
(0
.3
8)
F
SI
Z
(+
/−
)
−
0.
29
(0
.7
7)
2.
18
**
(0
.0
3)
−
0.
39
(0
.7
0)
0.
95
(0
.3
4)
−
0.
31
(0
.7
6)
1.
88
*
(0
.0
6)
−
0.
40
(0
.6
9)
0.
42
(0
.6
7)
F
PR
O
F
(+
/−
)
−
0.
63
(0
.5
3)
−
1.
04
(0
.3
0)
−
0.
51
(0
.6
1)
−
0.
04
(0
.9
7)
−
0.
50
(0
.6
1)
−
0.
85
(0
.3
9)
−
0.
36
(0
.7
2)
0.
60
(0
.5
5)
F
C
S
(+
/−
)
−
3.
22
**
*
(0
.0
0)
−
1.
38
(0
.1
7)
−
3.
00
**
*
(0
.0
0)
−
3.
29
**
*
(0
.0
0)
−
3.
28
**
*
(0
.0
0)
−
1.
86
*
(0
.0
6)
−
3.
09
**
*
(0
.0
0)
−
4.
22
**
*
(0
.0
0)
F
L
IQ
(+
/−
)
0.
64
(0
.5
2)
1.
07
(0
.2
9)
0.
68
(0
.5
0)
1.
18
(0
.2
4)
0.
77
(0
.4
4)
1.
11
(0
.2
7)
0.
84
(0
.4
0)
1.
27
(0
.2
0)
F
G
R
O
W
(+
)
0.
75
(0
.4
5)
0.
76
(0
.4
5)
0.
91
(0
.3
6)
0.
74
(0
.4
6)
0.
69
(0
.4
9)
0.
76
(0
.4
5)
0.
83
(0
.4
1)
0.
68
(0
.4
9)
F
L
O
SS
(+
)
1.
20
(0
.2
3)
−
0.
16
(0
.8
7)
1.
43
(0
.1
5)
0.
30
(0
.7
6)
1.
29
(0
.2
0)
−
0.
08
(0
.9
3)
1.
54
(0
.1
2)
0.
62
(0
.5
4)
Y
ea
rs
(+
/−
)
In
cl
ud
ed
In
cl
ud
ed
In
cl
ud
ed
In
cl
ud
ed
In
cl
ud
ed
In
cl
u
de
d
In
cl
u
de
d
In
cl
u
de
d
C
on
st
an
t
−
0.
05
(0
.9
6)
0.
18
(0
.8
5)
−
0.
05
(0
.9
6)
1.
31
(0
.1
9)
−
0.
08
(0
.9
4)
0.
41
(0
.6
9)
−
0.
07
(0
.9
5)
1.
92
*
(0
.0
5)
R
2
0.
08
0.
09
0.
09
0.
08
0.
08
0.
09
0.
09
0.
17
F
(W
al
d
ch
i2
)
36
.4
8*
**
27
.1
2*
**
42
.9
2*
**
40
.5
2*
**
36
.6
4*
**
27
.2
0*
**
43
.0
3*
**
48
.5
8*
**
N
46
2
28
0
46
2
28
0
46
2
28
0
46
2
28
0
N
ot
es
:
T
h
is
ta
bl
e
pr
es
en
ts
th
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
fi
xe
d
an
d
ra
n
do
m
ef
fe
ct
s
co
ef
fi
ci
en
ts
fr
om
fo
ur
di
ff
er
en
t
m
od
el
s
ex
am
in
in
g
th
e
m
od
er
at
in
g
ef
fe
ct
of
go
ve
rn
an
ce
qu
al
it
y
m
ea
su
re
d
by
th
e
co
rr
up
ti
on
va
ri
ab
le
on
th
e
re
la
ti
on
sh
ip
be
tw
ee
n
co
rp
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
(C
G
)
an
d
E
ar
n
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
as
fo
llo
w
s:
M
od
el
I
ex
am
in
es
w
h
et
h
er
C
G
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
re
du
ce
s
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
w
h
ol
e
pe
ri
od
of
7
ye
ar
s
fr
om
20
04
to
20
10
;
M
od
el
II
sh
ow
s
th
e
im
pa
ct
of
co
rp
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
on
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
a
pe
ri
od
of
3
ye
ar
s
20
04
,2
00
5,
an
d
20
06
w
h
ic
h
is
th
e
pe
ri
od
be
fo
re
th
e
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
;M
od
el
II
I
ex
am
in
es
th
e
im
pa
ct
of
co
rp
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
on
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
20
07
an
d
20
08
;a
n
d
M
od
el
IV
in
ve
st
ig
at
es
w
h
et
h
er
in
te
r-
n
al
C
G
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
ca
n
de
te
ct
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
af
te
r
th
e
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
fo
r
th
e
2
ye
ar
s
20
09
an
d
20
10
.V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
de
fi
n
ed
as
fo
llo
w
s:
in
de
pe
n
de
n
t
ou
ts
id
e
di
re
ct
or
s
(P
IO
D
),
in
de
pe
n
-
de
n
t
ou
ts
id
e
di
re
ct
or
s
m
u
lt
ip
lie
d
by
co
rr
up
ti
on
(P
IO
D
C
O
R
R
),
bo
ar
d
si
ze
(B
SI
Z
),
bo
ar
d
si
ze
m
ul
ti
pl
ie
d
by
co
rr
up
ti
on
(B
SI
Z
Z
C
O
R
R
);
C
E
O
du
al
it
y
(D
U
A
L
),
C
E
O
du
al
it
y
m
ul
ti
pl
ie
d
by
co
rr
up
ti
on
(D
U
A
L
C
O
R
R
),
fe
m
al
e
ra
ti
o
(B
F
E
M
),
bo
ar
d
fe
m
al
e
m
ul
ti
pl
ie
d
by
co
rr
up
ti
on
(B
F
E
M
C
O
R
R
),
co
rr
up
ti
on
us
ed
as
a
pr
ox
y
fo
r
go
ve
rn
an
ce
qu
al
it
y
(C
or
ru
pt
io
n
),
au
di
t
fi
rm
si
ze
(A
U
D
F
),
fi
rm
si
ze
(F
SI
Z
),
fi
rm
pr
of
it
ab
ili
ty
(F
PR
O
F
),
fi
rm
ca
pi
ta
l
st
ru
ct
ur
e
(F
C
S)
,f
ir
m
liq
ui
di
ty
(F
L
IQ
),
fi
rm
gr
ow
th
(F
G
R
O
W
),
fi
rm
lo
ss
(F
L
O
SS
).
T
ab
le
1
fu
lly
de
fi
n
es
al
l
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
us
ed
.
P
-v
al
u
es
ar
e
in
pa
re
n
th
es
es
.F
ol
lo
w
in
g
Pe
te
rs
en
(2
00
9)
,c
oe
ff
ic
ie
n
ts
ar
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
by
us
in
g
th
e
ro
bu
st
cl
us
te
re
d
SE
s
te
ch
n
iq
ue
.*
**
,*
*,
an
d
*
de
n
ot
e
si
gn
if
ic
an
ce
at
th
e
.1
,1
,5
,a
n
d
10
%
le
ve
l.
ABDOU ET AL. 19
T
A
B
L
E
9
G
R
N
N
1
(o
ve
ra
ll
sa
m
pl
e:
20
04
/1
0)
M
od
el
1
M
od
el
A
n
al
ys
is
M
od
el
I:
O
ve
ra
ll
Sa
m
p
le
M
od
el
II
:P
re
-C
ri
si
s
M
od
el
II
I:
C
ri
si
s
M
od
el
IV
:P
os
t-
C
ri
si
s
20
07
20
08
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
D
ia
gn
os
ti
c
cr
it
er
ia
G
oo
d
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
%
76
.4
1%
83
.5
7%
94
.4
4%
10
0.
00
%
34
.0
9%
10
0.
00
%
50
.0
0%
10
0.
00
%
59
.0
9%
65
.0
0%
R
M
SE
0.
01
3
0.
07
0.
00
5
0
0.
02
8
0
0.
02
3
0
0.
01
9
0.
14
7
M
A
E
0.
00
7
0.
03
8
0.
00
2
0
0.
02
2
0
0.
01
5
0
0.
01
2
0.
07
4
SD
A
E
0.
01
1
0.
05
9
0.
00
5
0
0.
01
8
0
0.
01
8
0
0.
01
4
0.
12
7
N
um
be
r
of
C
as
es
46
2
28
0
19
8
12
0
13
2
80
13
2
80
66
40
C
or
p
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
V
IA
PI
O
D
20
.7
4%
2.
73
%
33
.3
3%
13
.2
7%
0.
12
%
8.
80
%
8.
18
%
4.
08
%
14
.5
7%
0.
15
%
B
SI
Z
6.
29
%
0.
13
%
16
.8
4%
3.
09
%
0.
06
%
12
.0
9%
8.
09
%
19
.3
0%
7.
47
%
4.
20
%
D
U
A
L
0.
01
%
0.
01
%
0.
00
%
0.
00
%
0.
95
%
0.
51
%
2.
99
%
0.
08
%
2.
85
%
0.
00
%
B
F
E
M
18
.9
5%
11
.8
4%
24
.1
1%
6.
38
%
21
.3
8%
12
.8
5%
8.
08
%
19
.1
1%
8.
62
%
0.
87
%
C
on
tr
ol
V
IA
A
U
D
F
0.
92
%
0.
07
%
0.
02
%
0.
00
%
0.
00
%
0.
09
%
2.
47
%
0.
01
%
3.
22
%
0.
07
%
F
SI
Z
4.
77
%
56
.8
7%
1.
00
%
34
.3
0%
11
.1
2%
13
.9
6%
9.
12
%
50
.0
9%
10
.2
3%
94
.6
2%
F
PR
O
F
17
.3
1%
16
.6
6%
24
.3
9%
5.
32
%
60
.4
9%
13
.6
8%
15
.5
4%
0.
00
%
17
.2
0%
0.
00
%
F
C
S
14
.8
7%
1.
18
%
0.
29
%
13
.8
1%
0.
03
%
12
.1
0%
11
.8
2%
0.
46
%
8.
76
%
0.
00
%
F
L
IQ
4.
18
%
2.
28
%
0.
00
%
15
.9
1%
0.
14
%
12
.6
4%
11
.3
1%
3.
09
%
11
.9
1%
0.
06
%
F
G
R
O
W
0.
12
%
2.
49
%
0.
00
%
7.
36
%
0.
22
%
13
.2
7%
14
.8
1%
0.
14
%
9.
62
%
0.
00
%
F
L
O
SS
0.
01
%
0.
05
%
0.
00
%
0.
00
%
5.
44
%
0.
00
%
3.
76
%
1.
41
%
5.
55
%
0.
01
%
Y
4
0.
92
%
0.
04
%
0.
02
%
0.
13
%
Y
5
1.
06
%
0.
03
%
0.
00
%
0.
00
%
Y
6
0.
03
%
1.
19
%
0.
00
%
0.
44
%
Y
7
7.
91
%
0.
11
%
0.
02
%
0.
00
%
Y
8
1.
78
%
3.
85
%
0.
02
%
0.
00
%
Y
9
0.
10
%
0.
13
%
2.
07
%
1.
12
%
Y
10
0.
04
%
0.
33
%
1.
74
%
1.
12
%
Σ
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
10
0%
N
ot
es
:T
h
e
ta
bl
e
sh
ow
s
th
e
ge
n
er
al
iz
ed
re
gr
es
si
on
n
eu
ra
l
n
et
w
or
k
m
od
el
s
(G
R
N
N
1-
M
od
el
1)
fo
r
ea
ch
of
th
e
tw
o
co
un
tr
ie
s
co
m
bi
n
ed
w
it
h
ro
ot
m
ea
n
sq
ua
re
er
ro
r
(R
M
SE
)
m
ea
n
ab
so
lu
te
er
ro
r
(M
A
E
),
an
d
St
d.
D
ev
ia
ti
on
of
A
bs
.E
rr
or
(S
D
A
E
)
as
m
ea
su
re
s
fo
r
m
od
el
ac
cu
ra
cy
.V
IA
de
n
ot
es
va
ri
ab
le
s
im
pa
ct
an
al
ys
is
.I
t
al
so
sh
ow
s
fo
ur
m
od
el
s
as
fo
llo
w
s:
M
od
el
I
ex
am
in
es
w
h
et
h
er
C
G
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
re
du
ce
s
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
w
h
ol
e
pe
ri
od
of
7
ye
ar
s
fr
om
20
04
to
20
10
;
M
od
el
II
sh
ow
s
th
e
im
pa
ct
of
co
rp
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
on
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
a
pe
ri
od
of
3
ye
ar
s
20
04
,2
00
5,
an
d
20
06
w
h
ic
h
is
th
e
pe
ri
od
be
fo
re
th
e
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
;M
od
el
II
I
ex
am
in
es
th
e
im
pa
ct
of
co
rp
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
on
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
w
it
h
in
th
e
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
i-
si
s
20
07
an
d
20
08
;a
n
d
M
od
el
IV
in
ve
st
ig
at
es
w
h
et
h
er
in
te
rn
al
C
G
m
ec
h
an
is
m
s
ca
n
de
te
ct
ea
rn
in
gs
m
an
ag
em
en
t
af
te
r
th
e
fi
n
an
ci
al
cr
is
is
fo
r
th
e
2
ye
ar
s
20
09
an
d
20
10
.A
s
w
el
l
as
it
in
cl
ud
es
an
al
ys
is
fo
r
th
e
m
os
t
si
gn
if
ic
an
t
ye
ar
of
ea
ch
co
u
n
tr
y:
U
K
(2
00
7)
an
d
E
gy
pt
(2
00
8)
.
V
ar
ia
bl
es
ar
e
de
fi
n
ed
as
fo
llo
w
s:
in
de
pe
n
de
n
t
ou
ts
id
e
di
re
ct
or
s
(P
IO
D
),
bo
ar
d
si
ze
(B
SI
Z
),
C
E
O
du
al
it
y
(D
U
A
L
),
fe
m
al
e
ra
ti
o
(B
F
E
M
),
au
di
t
fi
rm
si
ze
(A
U
D
F
),
fi
rm
si
ze
(F
SI
Z
),
fi
rm
pr
of
it
ab
ili
ty
(F
PR
O
F
),
fi
rm
ca
pi
ta
l
st
ru
ct
ur
e
(F
C
S)
,
fi
rm
liq
ui
di
ty
(F
L
IQ
),
fi
rm
gr
ow
th
(F
G
R
O
W
),
fi
rm
lo
ss
(F
L
O
SS
).
T
ab
le
1
fu
lly
de
fi
n
es
al
lt
h
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
u
se
d.
20 ABDOU ET AL.
T
A
B
L
E
1
0
G
R
N
N
2
(t
ra
in
in
g/
h
ol
d-
ou
t
su
b-
se
ts
)
M
od
el
1
M
od
el
A
n
al
ys
is
M
od
el
I:
O
ve
ra
ll
Sa
m
p
le
20
04
/1
0
M
od
el
II
:P
re
-C
ri
si
s
M
od
el
II
I:
C
ri
si
s
M
od
el
IV
:P
os
t-
C
ri
si
s
20
07
20
08
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
U
K
E
gy
p
t
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
T
ra
in
H
.O
.
D
ia
gn
os
ti
c
cr
it
er
ia
G
oo
d
pr
ed
ic
ti
on
%
75
%
22
%
89
%
43
%
91
%
18
%
10
0%
50
%
39
%
31
%
10
0%
44
%
60
%
19
%
98
%
44
%
70
%
23
%
69
%
50
%
R
M
SE
0.
18
0.
27
0.
03
0.
05
0.
01
0.
07
0.
00
0.
28
0.
03
0.
04
0.
00
0.
26
0.
02
0.
04
0.
00
0.
09
0.
02
0.
05
0.
19
0.
26
M
A
E
0.
14
0.
17
0.
02
0.
04
0.
00
0.
04
0.
00
0.
18
0.
02
0.
03
0.
00
0.
19
0.
01
0.
04
0.
00
0.
07
0.
02
0.
04
0.
10
0.
18
SD
A
E
0.
06
0.
21
0.
03
0.
05
0.
01
0.
05
0.
00
0.
21
0.
02
0.
03
0.
00
0.
17
0.
02
0.
01
0.
00
0.
05
0.
01
0.
03
0.
17
0.
19
N
um
be
r
of
C
as
es
37
0
92
22
4
56
15
8
40
96
24
10
6
26
64
16
10
6
26
64
16
53
13
32
8
C
or
p
or
at
e
go
ve
rn
an
ce
V
IA
PI
O
D
23
.7
9%
7.
20
%
19
.4
6%
16
.1
9%
0.
63
%
11
.9
9%
13
.6
9%
2.
17
%
22
.4
4%
0.
25
%
B
SI
Z
6.
40
%
0.
29
%
12
.4
3%
12
.6
0%
0.
59
%
0.
61
%
8.
45
%
4.
03
%
13
.2
0%
13
.5
1%
D
U
A
L
0.
06
%
0.
02
%
0.
13
%
0.
05
%
0.
66
%
11
.5
8%
3.
35
%
0.
10
%
2.
15
%
0.
03
%
B
F
E
M
21
.4
3%
20
.2
4%
18
.0
5%
10
.9
1%
31
.1
5%
13
.8
7%
9.
92
%
14
.1
4%
18
.4
0%
0.
18
%
C
on
tr
ol
V
IA
A
U
D
F
0.
00
%
0.
05
%
1.
51
%
0.
17
%
0.
01
%
0.
00
%
1.
54
%
0.
00
%
5.
28
%
0.
08
%
F
SI
Z
20
.7
3%
63
.2
6%
11
.1
0%
17
.5
8%
0.
46
%
13
.2
8%
12
.2
6%
19
.8
9%
6.
16
%
84
.8
0%
F
PR
O
F
0.
65
%
13
.8
3%
22
.1
3%
12
.8
0%
42
.3
3%
13
.9
0%
12
.6
8%
10
.0
9%
5.
20
%
0.
01
%
F
C
S
10
.0
7%
0.
50
%
13
.0
0%
12
.6
8%
0.
01
%
11
.9
4%
9.
97
%
30
.0
6%
9.
02
%
0.
92
%
F
L
IQ
0.
08
%
4.
86
%
0.
13
%
12
.9
5%
0.
07
%
10
.1
1%
16
.6
7%
0.
05
%
7.
47
%
0.
12
%
F
G
R
O
W
0.
00
%
2.
25
%
0.
52
%
2.
51
%
0.
40
%
12
.7
1%
7.
36
%
19
.0
3%
4.
24
%
0.
08
%
F
L
O
SS
0.
00
%
0.
03
%
0.
04
%
0.
00
%
23
.6
7%
0.
00
%
2.
88
%
0.
02
%
6.
44
%
0.
01
%
Y
4
0.
00
%
0.
05
%
1.
51
%
0.
07
%
Y
5
0.
00
%
0.
04
%
0.
05
%
0.
00
%
Y
6
0.
01
%
0.
27
%
0.
03
%
1.
50
%
Y
7
16
.4
1%
0.
09
%
0.
02
%
0.
00
%
Y
8
0.
22
%
4.
73
%
0.
02
%
0.
00
%
Y
9
0.
14
%
0.
14
%
2.
79
%
0.
21
%
(C
on
ti
n
ue
s)
ABDOU ET AL. 21
DUALCORR (8.5%) – implying a significant impact of the
level of corruption on governance in Egypt. Fifthly, and
consistent with conventional regression results, FSIZ has
a strong relationship with EM in Egyptian companies
(i.e., 12.97). Finally, the weighted importance of corrup-
tion in Egypt has more than double the value compared
to the UK (5.91% vs. 2.63%). In the UK context, after
adding the moderating effect of GQ, the percentage of
females on the board becomes the key variable
(i.e., 25.90%), followed by the percentage of independent
outside directors on the board (i.e., 20.56%). These find-
ing are in line with the findings obtained from GRNN1-
Model1.
Following similar methodology, Table 12 shows the
results for GRNN2-Model2 using the training and the
hold-our sets, randomly selected by the software. We use
this model to examine the moderating influence of GQ,
calculated by control of corruption quality, on the rela-
tionship between CG and EM with the same variables
that have been used in the GRNN1-Model2 in Table 11.
To simplify the differentiation process, the findings in
Table 12 provide strong support for the findings in
Table 11, which relies on the overall sample for each
country. For Egypt, yet again, the predictive power from
the training set is superior to that of the UK. Egypt has a
100% good prediction rate, a lower RMSE and MAE of
zero compared to the UK (60, 2, and 1%, respectively).
In summary, using mutually supportive techniques
(i.e., GRNN and conventional regression), our purpose is
to compare the UK as a developed country with Egypt as
a developing country based on the internal governance
mechanisms that play effective roles in mitigating earn-
ings management. We also show the impact of GQ as a
moderating variable on the relationship between CG and
EM. We have been able to produce a range of critical and
significant findings. Our results cast light mainly on the
effect of corruption on Egyptian firms, while for the UK
firms, corruption has only a slight impact. For both coun-
tries, firms with a high percentage of independent outside
directors and low numbers of females on the board tend
to have low levels of EM. Meanwhile, based on BSIZ,
findings provide support for small BSIZ in the UK and
large BSIZ in Egypt. Further investigation shows that, for
both countries, CEO duality has no effect until the mod-
erating variables of GQ are added: the findings then
reveal a strong effect of CEO duality on the Egyptian
firms.
4.3 | Additional analyses
To demonstrate the effect and consequences of the finan-
cial crisis on the firms and to ascertain whether there areT
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contrasts in our results with respect to the period of
examination, we re-estimate our analyses (OLS regres-
sion, fixed/random effect, and GRNN) by dividing our
sample into three sub-samples in each table as follows:
Model II Pre-crisis (i.e., from 2004 to 2006); Model III
during the crisis (i.e., 2007 and 2008); and Model IV Post-
crisis (i.e., 2009 and 2010). The main model and three
pairwise comparisons of models differentiate them based
on the time-period that each model covers.
Firstly, we re-run the OLS regression for the main CG
variables (PIOD, BSIZ, DUAL, and BFEM). Table 4 shows
that the only significant CG variable for the UK before
the financial crisis (II) is the number of females on the
board (t = 2.21 at the 5% confidence level). However, this
finding has wrong sign to support our hypothesis H4.
Meanwhile, for Egyptian firms, both BSIZ and BFEM are
significant (with t = −1.86 and t = 1.94, respectively, at
the 10% confidence level), but with the wrong sign to
support our hypotheses H3 and H4. Furthermore, during
the crisis, UK firms have a significant positive relation-
ship between CEO duality (DUAL) and EM (t = 2.22 at
the 5% confidence level), providing empirical support for
H3. After the crisis, UK firms have no significant relation-
ship between CG variables and EM. Noticeably, models
III and IV (during and after the financial crisis) show that
the governance mechanisms (PIOD, BSIZ, DUAL, and
BFEM) are not able to detect EM within the Egyptian
firms. During the crisis, CG is not able to deter EM in the
Egyptian firms (as shown in Table 4 Model II). Table 5
reports that the coefficient of BFEM and duality corrup-
tion (DUALCORR) are positive (t = 1.78 and t = 1.95,
respectively, at the 10% confidence level), providing
empirical support for H5.
Secondly, we run fixed/random effect regression anal-
ysis for the three sub-models, as shown in Table 6. Before
the crisis (II), the two countries each have a significant
effect of BSIZ. However, for the UK, BSIZ is positive
(t = 2.40 at the 5% confidence level), and for Egypt, it is
negative (t = −1.87 at the 10% confidence level). More-
over, within the crisis, the coefficient of CEO duality
(DUAL) is positive (t = 1.93 at the 10% confidence level),
thus providing empirical support for H2 and H3 and dem-
onstrating that UK firms with large BSIZ and CEO dual-
ity tend to have high levels of EM. For Egypt, in the post-
financial-crisis model, CEO duality (DUAL) is negatively
associated with EM, which is contradictory to our
hypotheses.
Observably, for the three models (II, III, and IV), the
influence of CG on UK firms before the financial crisis
(II) is stronger than in Egypt, and the opposite is true
during (III) and after the crisis (IV). For the UK context,
board females multiplied by corruption (BFEMCORR) is
negatively related to EM in Model II of Table 7 (t = −2.43T
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at the 5% confidence level); thus, H5 is empirically
supported. However, during and after the crisis, BFEM
has no effect on EM. For Egypt before the financial crisis,
the results are almost the same as the UK results; how-
ever, these results show that during and after the crisis,
Egypt has a more significant coefficient than does the
UK. During the crisis, firms with CEO duality (DUAL)
have higher levels of EM (t = 2.06 at the 5% confidence
level). Post-crisis results indicate that firms with CEO
duality (DUAL) and lower numbers of females on the
board (BFEM) tend to have lower levels of EM, contrary
to our hypotheses.
Thirdly, we repeat our examination using an alterna-
tive measure of EM, namely Kothari et al.'s (2005) model,
given the limitations of the original Jones model (see
Kothari et al., 2005). This model calculates a firm-year
EM and has the advantages of varying through time and
reducing Type I errors (Kothari et al., 2005). We measure
EM using the Kothari et al. (2005) model as follows.
TAt
At−1
= α0 + β1
1
At−1
+ β2
ΔREVt−ΔRECtð Þ
At−1
+ β3
PPEt
At−1
+ β4ROAt + εt:
ð6Þ
Findings in Table 8 indicate that effective governance
structures are associated with reporting less EM by Egyp-
tian firms. Again, we find that effective independent
boards and AUDF type are associated negatively and sig-
nificantly with EM. More importantly, we have addi-
tional evidence to suggest that GQ moderates both board
size–EM and board diversity–EM relationships.
Fourthly, we use GRNN to compare the situation
before, during and after the financial crisis within the
two countries. GRNN1-Model1, shown in Table 9, reveals
that for the UK pre-crisis, the main key indicator is the
proportion of independent outside directors (PIOD, with
an impact factor of 33.33%), BFEM, with an impact factor
of 24.11%), and BSIZ, with an impact factor of 16.84%),
while within the crisis there is only one key CG indicator,
namely BFEM, with an impact factor of 21.38%). After
the crisis, UK firms are back to the original condition
where the main variables are similar to that pre-crisis:
PIOD (with an impact factor of 8.18%), BFEM (with an
impact factor of 8.09%), and BSIZ (with an impact factor
of 8.08%). The results presented in Table 9 show that for
Egypt, the three models (II, III, and IV) give 100% good
prediction rates. Using horizontal comparison between
models (II, III, and IV), we find that PIOD gradually loses
its effect in the Egyptian firms (with impact factors of
13%, 9%, and 4%, respectively), while BFEM gains more
weight within the models (with impact factors of 6%,
13%, and 19%, respectively). As previously discussed, we
divide our sample into two sub-sets (see Table 10). To
unwrap the comparison, the results of training samples
analyse for models II, III, and IV provide support for the
results shown in Table 9.
The results in Tables 11 and 12 provide support for
the main finding of the overall sample model (I) for the
two countries, which state that for Egyptian firms, cor-
ruption plays a vital role in EM and that we can deter
EM by controlling the corruption level in this country.
Finally, Model I of Table 9 shows that the most signifi-
cant year for the UK is 2007 (with an impact factor of
8%), while for Egypt it is 2008 (with an impact factor of
4%). Both represent the financial crisis: hence, we re-run
GRNN for the 2 years separately to show why they are
the most significant years. The 2007 results for the UK
show that the main variables in this year are as follows:
the proportion of independent outside directors (with an
impact factor of 14.57%), BFEM (with an impact factor of
8.62%), and BSIZ (with an impact factor of 7.47%), which
is consistent with the main model (I). However, for the
Egyptian firms, the only key CG variable is BSIZ (with an
impact factor of 4.20%). Our results using the training
and the hold-out sets for the 2007 and 2008 models in
Table 10 provide support for the results shown in Table 9
based on the overall sample for the 2 years.
After adding the moderating effect of GQ for the
models for the 2 years, surprisingly, the results show that
the UK firms have a higher percentage of corruption than
do the Egyptian firms (with an impact factor of 8% vs. an
impact factor of 1%), which is contradictory to our previ-
ous findings. For Egypt firms, consistent with the results
from Tables 9 and 10 in 2008, the results shown in
Table 11 confirm that the key CG variable for this year is
BSIZ. However, for UK firms, all the CG variables range
from an impact factor of 4% to an impact factor of 7%.
The results of the analyses of the training samples for the
2007 and 2008 models in Table 12 provide support for the
results shown in Table 11 based on the overall sample for
the 2 years.
5 | CONCLUSION AND AREAS FOR
FUTURE RESEARCH
Although a substantial number of studies have explored
the influence of a number of corporate governance mech-
anisms on the level of earnings management, their
results are mostly mixed. Using a sample of 742 firm-year
observations from the UK and Egypt from 2004 to 2010,
this study examines how the characteristics of the BoDs
(i.e., independent outside directors, BSIZ, CEO duality,
and females on the board) can deter EM in the UK and
Egypt over a 7-year period. We freshly apply a new meth-
odology by using generalized regression neural networks
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in addition to the conventional regression models in this
study. Our results indicate that for both countries, firms
with a high proportion of independent outside directors
tend to have lower levels of EM. In terms of BSIZ, find-
ings provide support for the benefits of small BSIZ in the
UK and large BSIZ in Egypt.
Moreover, our results show that CEO duality has no
effect until the moderating variables of GQ (measured by
level of corruption) are added. The findings reveal a
strong effect of CEO duality on the Egyptian firms. Fur-
thermore, for the UK and Egypt, firms with a high per-
centage of females participating on the board tend to
have high levels of EM. Overall, our results are consistent
with the multi-theoretical framework, which relies on
insights from the agency, stewardship, resource depen-
dence, information asymmetry and managerial signal-
ling, organizational and stakeholder theories. These
results were determined after controlling for a number of
variables, namely AUDF, FSIZ, ROA, leverage, FLIQ,
firm growth, and loss. This paper also investigates the
moderating effect of GQ, measured in terms of control of
corruption, on the relationship between EM and CG. Our
results cast light mainly on the effect of corruption on the
Egyptian firms, while for UK firms, corruption has only a
slight impact.
This study contributes to the existing literature in
three main ways. First, using a unique (hand collected)
dataset that imitates different corporate governance
structures and settings helps us shed further light on the
function of the institutional features of developing coun-
tries in describing the relation between BoDs and earn-
ings management. The analysis of this study also offers
more insights into the monitoring usefulness and the role
of BoDs mechanisms. Furthermore, this study, largely,
deal with the question whether there is a worldwide cor-
porate governance arrangement that should be pursued
regardless of institutional and structural variances across
countries. Additionally, our study highlights the fact that
institutional environment and the incentives for man-
agers may have a larger influence in rationalizing the
internal corporate governance-earnings management
association. Similarly, our study extends the research to
ethical features that are rare and have not been examined
yet in the relation between the internal mechanisms of
CG and EM in developing countries (e.g., Egypt), such as
corruption. Finally, the results also add to the gender lit-
erature by providing evidence that board diversity effec-
tiveness in curbing earnings management depends on
country GQ.
There are several important implications of our
study. First, this study suggests that specific corporate
governance mechanisms such as the adoption of inde-
pendent directors emphasized in the UK could produce
effective monitoring in mitigating earnings management
even in a country like Egypt where there is a lack of
complementary legal infrastructure. Second, our results
have implications for regulators and policy-makers by
sending an urgent message to the regulators of Egypt
that corruption has a very strong hidden effect on EM
and that they can deter EM by controlling the corrup-
tion level in their country. Third, these results improve
the credibility of financial statements for investors in
both the UK and Egypt, since they provide empirical
evidence that the BoDs play a vital role in mitigating
EM. Fourth, the results of our study should be of consid-
erable interest to regulators and policy-makers in devel-
oping countries, and highlight the fact that there is no
exclusive and universal corporate governance system
that fits all and that the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate
governance may not always be the optimal to follow.
Thus, each country should design its corporate gover-
nance code in a way that matches its institutional, legal
and political needs. Future research should consider
including more countries when investigating the impact
of CG on EM, and extending the Egyptian data beyond
2011 where available to investigate the effect of the
recent unrest on EM. Further research can also consider
other CG mechanisms and take into account the exter-
nal CG mechanisms. We also suggest the use of real EM
or classification shifting to measure EM. Future
research could study the role of CG in reducing levels of
corruption in emerging markets and how this can con-
strain the level of EM. The issues of data limitation in
quality, variety and quantity need to be confronted
rather than avoided by an on-going emphasis on data-
rich developed countries.
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